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Devolution of the Crown Estate and 
Energy Policy in Scotland 
 
Aileen McHarg, School of Law, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This policy briefing explains the role of the Crown Estate in energy policy and explores 
the potential significance of its devolution to Scotland.  Energy ± and particularly 
renewable energy ± is an important policy area for the Scottish Government, both for its 
SRWHQWLDOFRQWULEXWLRQWR6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDQGIRULWVUROHLQPHHWLQJ 
6FRWODQG¶VDPELWLRXVFOLPDWHFKDQJHPLWLJDWLRQWDUJHWV&XUUHQWO\WKRXJKWKH6FRWWLVK
Government and Scottish Parliament control relatively few energy policy levers, with 
most relevant powers being reserved to the UK Parliament and Government under the 
Scotland Act 1998.1  However, the Smith Commission, which was established in the wake 
RIWKHµQR¶YRWHLQWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXPWRFRQVLGHUIXUWKHUGHYROXWLRQRISRZHUV
to Scotland, has recently recommended that there should be some additional devolution 
of energy policy and related powers to Scotland.2  Assuming that the recommendations 
are implemented, one of the most significant of these new powers is control over the 
Crown Estate in Scotland.3  
 
 
 
I What is the Crown Estate and What Does it Do? 
 
The Crown Estate controls some, but not all, of the land vested in the Queen in her 
governmental capacity (as distinct from her personal capacity).  The institution dates back to 
1760, when George III surrendered the revenues from Crown lands to Parliament in return for 
support from the Civil List; an arrangement confirmed by each subsequent Monarch.  Crown 
Estate lands are therefore effectively public lands held in trust for the benefit of the nation.  
Today, the Crown Estate encompasses certain hereditary property rights deriving from feudal 
times, as well as more recent rights vested in the Crown by statute, and modern property 
acquisitions.  The powers of ownership over the assets included in the Crown Estate are 
exercised by the Crown Estate Commissioners under the Crown Estate Act 1961.  The 
Commissioners are legally independent, but subject to direction by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
 
                                               
1 Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, Pt II, Head D. 
2 Report of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament, 27 
November 2014, available at: https://www.smith-commission.scot/smith-commission-report/.  
3 Currently reserved by Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, Pt I, para 2(3). 
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7KH&URZQ(VWDWH¶VKROGLQJVLQ6FRWODQGDUHOHJDOO\GLVWLQFWIURPWKRVHLQ the rest of the UK.  In 
contrast to the position in England, the most important Crown Estate assets in Scotland are 
rights over the seabed and foreshore (the so-FDOOHGµ0DULQH(VWDWH¶8QGHU6FRWVFRPPRQODZ
the Crown owns around 50% of the foreshore aQGDOPRVWDOORIWKHVHDEHGZLWKLQ6FRWODQG¶V
territorial waters (out to the 12 nautical mile limit).  Under the Continental Shelf Act 1964, the 
Crown Estate also exercises rights over the seabed and subsoil in the UK Continental Shelf, 
including its natural resources other than coal and hydrocarbons.4  In addition, the Crown Estate 
has been granted rights over the production of energy from water and winds in Renewable 
Energy Zones by the Energy Act 2004 and over the offshore storage of natural gas and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in Gas Storage and Importation Zones by the Energy Act 2008. 
 
Historically, the Crown Estate played only a minimal role in relation to offshore energy 
production.  However, the expansion of offshore energy uses together with new statutory rights 
mean that it now has a crucial role to play in the development of offshore renewables and energy 
storage.  Anyone seeking to build an offshore windfarm or a wave or tidal generator, to lay 
offshore transmission cables, or to develop offshore gas or CO2 storage facilities or pipelines 
requires a lease from the Crown Estate,5 as well as the relevant statutory consents and licences. 
 
The allocation of marine property rights to the Crown Estate has a dual significance.  First, it 
gives the Crown Estate a planning and regulatory role in relation to the offshore renewables 
and storage industries, through the selection of sites for development and the specification of 
leasing terms.  In particular, the Crown Estate plays an important role in managing potentially 
conflicting uses of the seabed and establishing priorities amongst them.  Secondly, the 
extraction of rents for the use of the seabed and marine resources for energy purposes provides 
a potentially significant revenue stream which currently flows to the Treasury through the 
Consolidated Fund.  It is obviously essential that both sets of powers are exercised in a manner 
which is compatible with the sustainable use of the marine environment and consistent with 
wider energy policy goals. 
 
II The Case for Devolution 
 
There is long-standing dissatisfaction with the operation of the Crown Estate in Scotland, which 
in some respects pre-dates devolution.  However, devolution has intensified the case for reform, 
not least because the Crown Estate has become more centralised since 1999, having abolished 
its Scottish division in 2001 in favour of a functional structure across the whole of the UK.  The 
                                               
4 KǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽĐŽĂůĂƌĞǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽĂůƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
to hydrocarbons are exercised by the Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
5 ƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞůĞĂƐŝŶŐƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚǁŽƐƚĂŐĞƐ ?ĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂů ?ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ>ĞĂƐĞ ?ƉĞƌŵŝƚƐƚŚĞ
developer to explore the site and seek necessary consents and licences; once these have been 
obtained, a lease is granted. 
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&DOPDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V  UHSRUW QRWHG WKH VWUHQJWK RI FULWLFLVP RI WKH &URZQ (VWDWH DQG
recommended reforms to ensure that it had greater regard to Scottish interests and the Scottish 
policy context, but rejected the argument that it should be devolved to the Scottish Parliament.6  
An attempt in 2011 by the SNP to amend the subsequent Scotland Bill to remove the reservation 
of the Crown Estate was also comprehensively rejected.  However, in 2012, the case for 
devolution gained cross-party support in a highly critical report by the House of Commons 
Scottish Affairs Committee,7 although none of the Unionist parties committed unambiguously to 
this in their pre-referendum proposals for further devolution. 
 
The case for devolution of the Crown Estate is twofold.  First, there is no clear rationale for the 
current division of competences between the Crown Estate and devolved institutions in 
6FRWODQG$VDOUHDG\QRWHGWKH&URZQ(VWDWHDGPLQLVWHUVRQO\VRPHRIWKH&URZQ¶VSURSHUW\
holdings, others of which are already devolved in Scotland, and the Scottish Parliament also 
has control over the definition of Crown property rights, insofar as these derive from common 
law rather than statute.  In addition, the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government control 
most of the policy responsibilities relevant to the administration of the Crown Estate in Scotland.  
In the energy field, for instance, the Scottish Government has the lead role on promotion of 
renewables, and also controls marine licensing8 and energy consents.9 
 
The current division of ownership rights and regulatory responsibilities is highly problematic.  
For one thing, it is cumbersome, costly and potentially confusing for developers to have to seek 
both a lease from the Crown Estate and the necessary licences and consents from the Scottish 
Government.  This goes against the grain of recent marine legislation which has sought to 
streamline regulatory procedures as far as possible.  More importantly, it also poses a risk of 
lack of co-ordination between the leasing and regulatory regimes.  While regulation seeks to 
influence the nature and location of offshore developments, ownership rights remain a crucial 
determinant of how, when and by whom such development takes place.  Since the Crown Estate 
is not accountable to the Scottish Parliament, nor under any obligation to co-ordinate with the 
Scottish Government, there is a clear risk that it could undermine the achievement of Scottish 
energy policy goals.  Further, the Scottish Government has no opportunity to use the revenue 
JDLQHG IURPH[SORLWDWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶VQDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV LQZD\V WKDWEHQHILWV WKHSHRSOHRI
                                               
6 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 
21st Century. 
7 The Crown Estate in Scotland, 7th Report 2010-12, HC 1117 
8 Marine licensing within Scottish territorial waters is legislatively devolved and is governed by the 
Marine (Scotland) Act 2010; marine licensing outwith territorial waters is governed by the Marine and 
Coastal Access Act 2009, but is executively devolved to the Scottish Ministers. 
9 Consents to offshore generating stations and power lines are governed by ss. 36 and 37 of the 
Electricity Act 1989 and are executively devolved to the Scottish Ministers.  N.b., licensing and 
permitting of gas and carbon storage facilities is governed by the Energy Act 2008 and is shared 
between the UK and Scottish Governments. 
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Scotland oUWKHFRPPXQLWLHV¶GLUHFWO\DIIHFWHG10 thereby enhancing the public acceptability and 
hence the success of its energy policies. 
 
The second argument for devolution stems from the way in which the Crown Estate currently 
operates.  Its statutory duty is to maintain the Crown Estate µDVDQHVWDWHLQODQG«WRPDLQWDLQ
and enhance its value and the return obtained from it, but with due regard to the requirements 
RIJRRGPDQDJHPHQW¶11  ,WLQWHUSUHWVWKLVZLWKWKH7UHDVXU\¶VVXSSRUWWRPHDQWKDWLWVKRXOG
act as a commercial property business, aiming to maximise revenues, subject to requirements 
of integrity and good stewardship,12 but prohibited from taking account of wider public interest 
or policy objectives.  This commercial rather than governmental conception of its role also leads, 
it is claimed, to a lack of transparency, accountability and public participation in its decision-
making processes, and a lack of communication and engagement with key stakeholders and 
local communities.  In its 2012 report, the Scottish Affairs Committee concluded that: 
 
 ?ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
of local communities and indigenous industries on the Scottish coast.  At best, it has 
little regard for those needs and interests other than where it serves [the Crown 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ƚǁŽƌƐƚ ? ŝƚďĞŚĂǀĞƐĂƐĂŶĂďƐĞŶƚĞĞ ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŽƌ ƚĂǆ
collector which does not re-invest to any significant extent in the sectors and 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĚĞƌŝǀĞƐŝŶĐŽŵĞ ? ?13 
 
For the Committee, the Crown Estate was simply not µILW IRUSXUSRVH¶ as the administrator of 
6FRWODQG¶VVHDEHG µDSXEOLFO\RZQHGQDWLRQDODVVHWZKLFKUHTXLUHVSURSHUPXOWLSOHREMHFWLYH
management in the public interest to benefit the people of Scotland and its many coastal 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶14 
 
Devolution of the Crown Estate thus represents an opportunity to reform the purposes for which 
the seabed is managed; to integrate the leasing and regulatory regimes more effectively; and 
to ensure a more satisfactory distribution of the financial benefits arising from offshore energy 
and other developments.  Care will have to be taken, however, to avoid conflicts of interest 
between revenue objectives and regulatory responsibilities.  The agreement to devolve the 
Crown Estate is also subject to the proviso that: 
 
 ?dŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ h< 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ǁŝůů ĚƌĂǁ ƵƉ ĂŶĚ ĂŐƌĞĞ Ă DĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵ ŽĨ
Understanding to ensure that such devolution is not detrimental to UK-wide critical 
                                               
10 Although the Treasury does return most of the revenue to Scotland via its Coastal Communities 
Fund. 
11 Crown Estate Act 1961, s.1(3). 
12 See http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/who-we-are/our-values/.  
13 Above n 7, para 65. 
14 Ibid., para 75. 
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national infrastructure in relation to matters such as defence & security, oil & gas and 
energy, thereby safeguarding the defence and security importance of the Crown 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨŽƌĞƐŚŽƌĞĂŶĚƐĞĂďĞĚĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽƚŚĞh<ĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?15 
 
 
III The Crown Estate and Islands Communities 
 
The Smith Commission report also contains a second proviso to the effect that following transfer 
of the Crown Estate to the Scottish Parliament µUHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI WKRVH
assets will be further devolved to local authority areas such as Orkney, Shetland, Na h-Eilean 
6LDU RU RWKHU DUHDV ZKR VHHN VXFK UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶16  It is unusual for devolution to be 
conditional in this way, and it is not yet clear whether this principle of double devolution will be 
included in the implementing legislation itself, or merely contained in a side agreement.  
However, the commitment to further transfer of management of the Crown Estate reflects a 
successful campaign by the three islands councils during the referendum campaign17 to extract 
promises from both the Scottish and UK governments to secure greater powers irrespective of 
the result.18 
 
The prospect of transferring control over the seabed to the three islands councils ± and possibly 
also to Argyll & Bute, Highlands, and North Ayrshire councils ± is by far the most radical 
implication of Crown Estate devolution.  It means that island and coastal communities will for 
the first time gain meaningful control over the use that is made of their marine resources, as 
well a revenue stream which can be reinvested for locally-determined purposes.  The evidence 
suggests that equity in the division of the benefits and burdens of renewable energy 
development is crucial to its public acceptability, and that the opportunity to share in the 
ownership of renewable energy projects offers far greater benefits than the ex gratia community 
benefit payments normally made by developers.19  Indeed, the evidence from onshore 
renewables projects is that community ownership ± such as on Gigha and Eigg ± can have a 
transformative impact on often fragile economies in remote highlands and islands areas, 
                                               
15 Smith Commission, above n 2, para 34. 
16 Ibid, para 33. 
17 Our Islands Our Future, June 2013, available at: 
http://www.shetland.gov.uk/OIOF/documents/ourislands-ourfuture-JointPositionStatement-
17june2013.pdf.  
18 See Island Areas Ministerial Working Group, ŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ/ƐůĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ, June 2014, 
available at; http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2014/06/2708; UK Government and the Three 
Scottish Islands Councils, A Framework for the Islands, August 2014, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/344446/UKG_ISLAN
DS_FRAMEWORK_-_15_August.pdf.  
19 See, e.g., G Allan et al, The Importance of Revenue Sharing for the Local Economic Impacts of a 
Renewable Energy Project: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach, Strathclyde Discussion Papers in 
Economics, No 8-11, 2008, available at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/media/departments/economics/researchdiscussionpapers/2008/08-
11strathecon.pdf. 
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enabling them to exploit the renewable energy potential of their geography and climate to offset 
those same geographic and climatic disadvantages.  Double devolution of the Crown Estate 
therefore offers the prospect of similar advantages from offshore renewables development, but 
on a much larger and more systematic scale. 
 
Use of the seabed will, of course, still be subject to Scottish (and UK) Government licensing 
and consenting powers, and co-ordination will be required to avoid new problems of conflicting 
REMHFWLYHV7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V/DQG5HIRUP5HYLHZ*URXSKDVDOVRUHFHQWO\ZDUQHG
that µZKDWHYHU DUUDQJHPHQWV PLJKW EH UHDFKHG WR GHFHQWUDOLVH WKe control and use of the 
VHDEHG WKH RYHUDOO LQWHJULW\RI 6FRWODQG¶VRZQHUVKLS RI LWVRZQ WHUULWRULDO VHDEHGVKRXOGEH
PDLQWDLQHGDQGVDIHJXDUGHGLQWKHORQJWHUPQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶20  Nevertheless, as the north of 
Scotland faces its third wave of transformative energy development ± first, the post-war 
electrification of the Highlands, then the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s, and now the 
development of wind and marine renewables ± double devolution of the Crown Estate offers for 
the first time a guarantee that the benefits to be gained from Scotland natural energy resources 
will flow directly to those communities most immediately affected. 
 
                                               
20 The Land of Scotland and the Common Good, May 2014, p 65, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00451087.pdf.  
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